

Who Left Open the Cookie Jar? A Comprehensive Evaluation of Third-Party Cookie Policies

Tom Van Goethem (joint work with Gertjan Franken & Wouter Joosen)
22 February 2019





When the web was designed, security was a high priority.


When the web was designed, security was a high priority.

BUSINESS!

Do you trust your
browser?

How many lines of code
does Firefox have?

Lines of code for Firefox



Source: https://www.openhub.net/p/firefox/analyses/latest/languages_summary

How many different
features do modern
browser support?

Chrome 72: 343

Firefox 65: 325

Safari 12: 292

Edge 18: 263

CSS

- ::first-letter CSS pseudo-element selector
- ::placeholder CSS pseudo-element
- ::selection CSS pseudo-element
- :dir() CSS pseudo-class
- :has() CSS relational pseudo-class
- :in-range and :out-of-range CSS pseudo-classes
- :matches() CSS pseudo-class
- :placeholder-shown CSS pseudo-class
- @font-face Web fonts
- Blending of HTML/SVG elements
- calc() as CSS unit value
- Case-insensitive CSS attribute selectors
- ch (character) unit
- 2.1 selectors
- ::marker pseudo-element
- :read-only and :read-write selectors
- all property

HTML5

- accept attribute for file input
- Attributes for form submission
- Audio element
- Audio Tracks
- Autofocus attribute
- Canvas (basic support)
- Canvas blend modes
- classList (DOMTokenList)
- Color input type
- contenteditable attribute (basic support)
- Custom Elements (V1)
- Custom protocol handling
- Datalist element
- dataset & data-* attributes
- Date and time input types
- Details & Summary elements
- Dialog element

SVG

- Inline SVG in HTML5
- SVG (basic support)
- SVG effects for HTML
- SVG favicons
- SVG filters
- SVG fragment identifiers
- SVG in CSS backgrounds
- SVG in HTML img element
- SVG SMIL animation
- SVG fonts
- **All SVG features**

JS API


- AbortController & AbortSignal
- Accelerometer

Do you trust your
browser?



Do you use an
ad-blocker or
anti-tracking extension?

Do you trust your privacy
extension to block all
trackers/ads?



Overview



Cookies & SOP 101



Cross-site attacks
and tracking



Third-party cookie
policies




Comprehensive
evaluation





Conclusion



Cookie inclusion




Cookie inclusion



Cookie inclusion





Cookie inclusion




HTTP cookies [1]

- › Implicit inclusion
- › Authentication / identification
- › Same-Origin Policy





[1] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265, DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011.

Cookie inclusion




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

[1] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265, DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011.

Cookie inclusion




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



[1] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265, DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011.



Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous





Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous




Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous




Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous




Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous




Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous




Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous





Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous





Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous



Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous



Third-party requests: implicit and ubiquitous



Cross-site attacks



Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- › Authenticated
state-changing
request

Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- › Authenticated state-changing request



victim




cute-kittens.com




Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- › Authenticated state-changing request



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
victim



cute-kittens.com



doggo-bank.com



```

```


Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- › Authenticated state-changing request




victim



cute-kittens.com



doggo-bank.com



```

```

Cross-site Request Forgery



OWASP

Open Web Application
Security Project

› OWASP Top 10

2010
5th place



2013
8th place



2017
dropped

› Why?

›› Framework-integrated server-side defenses

›› Awareness

OpenEMR security flaws could have exposed millions of patient records

Over 20 severe bugs were found using only manual methods by a single cybersecurity group.



By Charlie Osborne for Zero Day | August 8, 2018 -- 10:40 GMT (11:40 BST) | Topic: Security

30

The health records of millions of patients worldwide were potentially left open to attack by a slew of critical vulnerabilities uncovered by a single cybersecurity team.

OpenEMR is a popular, open-source software solution for the management of millions of electronic patient records worldwide. However, the software, until recently, also contained over 20 severe security issues.

Discovered by Project Insecurity and disclosed in a security team said the bugs included multiple

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Security

CSRF Vulnerability in phpMyAdmin 4.7.x Lets Attackers Delete Records through malicious URLs

By Zainab Imran • September 6, 2018

0 Comments 1 minute read

A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability has been found in the phpMyAdmin version 4.7.x (before version 4.7.7) through which malicious attackers are able to perform fundamental database operations by tricking users into clicking on maliciously crafted URLs. This vulnerability has been combined under the CVE identification label CVE-2017-1000499 which was assigned to previous CSRF vulnerabilities in phpMyAdmin as well.

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Phishing attacks becoming more targeted, phishers



Zeljka Zorz, Managing Editor
October 3, 2018

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Popular TP-Link wireless home router open to remote hijacking

By concatenating a known improper authentication flaw with a newly discovered CSRF vulnerability, remote unauthenticated attackers can gain control over TP-Link TL-WR841N routers worldwide



How science can fight insider threats
How to make the CFO your best cybersecurity friend
Safeguarding hybrid-cloud infrastructures through identity privilege management
Why you should take an operational approach to risk management

Cross-site Request Forgery

- › Why is this still a problem?
 - ›› Defense (e.g. random token in request parameters) needs to be applied ubiquitously
 - ›› Insecure by default
- › How to move on from here?
 - ›› SameSite cookies -> secure by default (if enforced correctly by the browser)

Cross-site script inclusion (XSSI) [1]


Same Origin Policy:



victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com




 Dynamically generated JavaScript

```
<script src="https://doggo-bank.com/bank-account.js">  
</script>
```

[1] Lekies et al. 2015. The unexpected dangers of dynamic JavaScript. In Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (SEC'15), Jaeyeon Jung (Ed.). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 723-735.

Cross-site script inclusion (XSSI) [1]

Examples




[1] Lekies et al. 2015. The unexpected dangers of dynamic JavaScript. In Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium (SEC'15), Jaeyeon Jung (Ed.). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 723-735.

XSSI defenses

- › Separate sensitive data from scripts
 - ›› Avoid using JSON with Padding (JSONP)
 - ›› Use Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) instead


- › Avoid executable JSON files
 - ›› Unparseable or add valid JS that ends execution

Cross-site timing attack




~19kB

Cross-site timing attack




~183kB



~19kB

Cross-site timing attacks [1]

State-dependent content



[1] Bortz et al. 2007. Exposing private information by timing web applications. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web (WWW '07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 621-628.

Cross-site timing attacks [1]

State-dependent content



victim


cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



Start timer

Stop timer



```

```

[1] Bortz et al. 2007. Exposing private information by timing web applications. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web (WWW '07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 621-628.

Cross-site timing attacks [1]

State-dependent content



victim


cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



Start timer

Stop timer



```

```

error event

[1] Bortz et al. 2007. Exposing private information by timing web applications. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web (WWW '07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 621-628.

Cross-site timing attacks [1]

State-dependent content



→ Logged in or not?

victim

cute-kittens.com


doggo-bank.com

→ #items in online basket



Start timer

Stop timer



```

```

↳ **error event**

[1] Bortz et al. 2007. Exposing private information by timing web applications. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web (WWW '07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 621-628.

Cross-site timing attacks [1]

State-dependent content




Start timer

Stop timer

victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com




```

```

↳ error event

[1] Bortz et al. 2007. Exposing private information by timing web applications. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web (WWW '07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 621-628.


Browser-based timing attacks [1]



victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



- Abuse of firing events during parsing process
- **suspend** when fetched
 - **error** on fail

[1] Van Goethem et al. The Clock is Still Ticking: Timing Attacks in the Modern Web. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1382-1393.

CROSS-SITE ATTACKS

CROSS-SITE ATTACKS EVERYWHERE



Cross-site attacks everywhere

- › HEIST (HTTP Encrypted Information can be Stolen through TCP-windows)
 - ›› Leverages Fetch API + Resource Timing API to apply compression-based attack (BREACH) to leak secrets, such as CSRF token
- › Measure cross-origin response size through Cache API
- › Use Quota Management API & Storage API to find exact response size
- › XS-Search (response inflation, computation inflation)
 - ›› E.g. attack against Google's bug tracker (Monorail) to find undisclosed vulnerabilities (uses XS-Search + Cache API attacks) [1]

¹ <https://medium.com/@luanherrera/xs-searching-googles-bug-tracker-to-find-out-vulnerable-source-code-50d8135b7549>

Third-party tracking


Third-party Tracking

victim




cat-news.com

Third-party Tracking




Third-party Tracking




```
<script src="https://paw-book.com/widget.js?url=cat-news.com/catnip.html"></script>
```

Third-party Tracking




```
<script src="https://paw-book.com/widget.js  
?url=cat-news.com/catnip.html"></script>
```


Third-party Tracking




- › Aggregate unique browsing profiles



```
<script src="https://paw-book.com/widget.js?url=cat-news.com/catnip.html"></script>
```

Third-party Tracking



victim



cat-news.com



paw-book.com

Tracking the Trackers


Zhonghao Yu
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Third-party Tracking



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Tracking the Trackers

Zhonghao Yu

Sam Macbeth

Konark Modi

“95% of the pages visited contain 3rd party requests to potential trackers
78% attempt to transfer unsafe data”


Pornhub Bypasses Ad Blockers With WebSockets



BugReplay

Follow

Nov 1, 2016 · 4 min read




Juridical perspective: GDPR

Joint study by Cliqz and Ghostery [1]

- › Average number of trackers per website decreased
- › Most advertisers lost reach
- › Google slightly gained reach

EU market share of adtech vendors: change in website reach
April to July 2018



[1] <https://cliqz.com/en/magazine/study-google-is-the-biggest-beneficiary-of-the-gdpr>

Third-party cookie policies

Cookie policies for privacy

› Built-in browser options

- ›› Block third-party cookies
- ›› Firefox Tracking Protection
- ›› Opera Ad Blocker
- ›› Safari Intelligent Tracking Prevention

› Extensions

- ›› Ad blocking
- ›› Privacy protection

Client-side defense mechanisms

How do the more advanced policies work?

- › Block cross-site requests/cookies, based on:
 - ›› Blacklists (e.g. EasyList)
 - ››› Publicly available
 - ››› Systematically updated
 - ›› Machine learning (e.g. Safari)
 - ››› Based on browsing behavior

```
&action=js_stats&
&callback=hitStats_
&ctxId=*&pubId=*&clientDT=
&ctxId=*&pubId=*&objId=
&event=view&
&funnel_state=
&http_referer=$script
&pageReferrer=
&ref=*&tag=
&refer=http$script
&referrerPageDetail=
&trackingserver=
-action/fingerprint?
-action/ping?
-ads-tracking-
-AdTracking.
-analytics//fab.
-analytics//ga.
-analytics//metrlica.
-analytics/fab.
-analytics/ga.
-analytics/metrlica.
-analytics-tagserver-
-analytics-wi.
-analytics/insight.
-appanalytics-
-asset-tag.
-audience-science-pixel/
-baynote.
```


Same-site cookie [1] (= defense for security)

In-depth defense against cross-site attacks

- › Cookie with extra attribute 'SameSite'
 - ›› SameSite=strict → NO CROSS-SITE REQUESTS!
 - ›› SameSite=lax → exceptions: top-level GET, prerender

- › Adoption by websites is rather slow
 - ›› Interesting blog: Dropbox's use case [2]

[1] West, M., Goodwin, M. Same-site cookies. Internet- Draft draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site-00, IETF Secretariat, June 2016.

[2] <https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2017/03/preventing-cross-site-attacks-using-same-site-cookies/>

Use of same-site cookies

against cross-site attacks

doggo-bank.com



victim



cute-kittens.com



doggo-bank.com



Use of same-site cookies

against cross-site attacks




doggo-bank.com

victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



Set-Cookie: auth=ekSd2lksq090pQDs; SameSite=strict

Use of same-site cookies

against cross-site attacks




doggo-bank.com

victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



Set-Cookie: auth=ekSd2lksq090pQDs; SameSite=strict

Why evaluate third-party cookie policies?

- › Browsers are known to exhibit inconsistent behavior
 - ›› Interference from different standards
 - ›› Unintended side-effects by code modification
- › Saturated market of extensions
 - ›› No clear quantification of quality

Automated evaluation of effectiveness



Comprehensive evaluation


Black box approach

- › Browsers consist of millions of lines of code
 - ›› Source code not always available
- › Many extensions



Framework

Design



Inside the framework

- › Browser control
 - ›› Selenium / Command line interface
- › Web server
 - ›› Initiate cross-site requests to blacklisted domain
 - ›› Proxy intercepts all requests















Initiating cross-site requests

- › AppCache API
 - ›› Caching cross-site pages
- › HTML-tags
 - ›› <script>, , <link>, etc.
- › Headers
 - ›› Link, CSP headers
- › Redirects
- › JavaScript
 - ›› Fetch, EventSource API, etc.
- › PDF JS
 - ›› sendForm()
- › ServiceWorker API

Overview

› Browsers

- ›› Chrome  
- ›› Opera  
- ›› Firefox  
- ›› Safari  
- ›› Edge  
- ›› Tor Browser 
- ›› Cliqz 

› Extensions

›› Ad blocking (31)



›› Tracking protection (15)



	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 11	○ [†]	◐	○	●	○	◐	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [†]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies [‡]	● [†]	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Cliqz 1.17*	◐	●	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
Tor Browser 7	○	◐	◐	●	○	◐	N/A

●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

* Secure cookies were omitted in all requests.

[†] Safari does not permit cross-domain caching over https (only over http). 48

[‡] Safari 10.1.2

	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	☹	☹	☹	●	●	☹	☹
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	☹	☹	☹	●	●	☹	☹
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	☹	☹	☹	●	○	☹	☹
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 11	○ [†]	☹	○	●	○	☹	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [‡]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies [‡]	● [‡]	●	☹	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	☹	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	☹	●	○	●	N/A
Cluz 1.17*	☹	●	☹	●	○	☹	☹
- Block third-party cookies	☹	☹	☹	●	○	☹	☹
Tor Browser 7	○	☹	☹	●	○	☹	N/A

●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

* Secure cookies were omitted in all requests.

† Safari does not permit cross-domain caching over https (only over http). 49

‡ Safari 10.1.2

	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	◐	◐	◐	●	●	◐	◐
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 10	○ [†]	◐	○	●	○	◐	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [†]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies‡	● [†]	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
Clash 1.17*	◐	●	◐	●	○	◐	◐
- Block third-party cookies	◐	◐	◐	●	○	◐	◐
Tor Browser 7	○	◐	◐	●	○	◐	N/A

●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

* Secure cookies were omitted in all requests.

† Safari does not permit cross-domain caching over https (only over http). 50

‡ Safari 10.1.2

	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirects	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome 63	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	€	€	€	●	●	€	€
Opera 51	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
- Block third-party cookies*	€	€	€	●	●	€	€
- Ad Blocker	●	●	○	●	○	●	●
Firefox 57	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
- Block third-party cookies	€	€	€	●	○	€	€
- Tracking Protection	●	●	●	●	○	●	●
Safari 11	○ [†]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- No Intelligent Tracking Prevention	● [‡]	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies [‡]	● [‡]	●	€	●	○	●	N/A
Edge 40	●	●	€	●	○	●	N/A
- Block third-party cookies	●	●	€	●	○	●	N/A
Clash 1.17*	€	●	€	●	○	€	€
- Block third-party cookies	€	€	€	●	○	€	€
Tor Browser 7	○	€	€	●	○	€	N/A

●: request with cookies

●: request without cookies

○: no request

* Secure cookies were omitted in all requests.

† Safari does not permit cross-domain caching over https (only over http). 51

‡ Safari 10.1.2

		AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirect	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome	SET A1 (3/14)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A2 (3/14)	●	○	◐	●	●	●	●
	SET A3 (1/14)	●	○	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A4 (1/14)	●	○	○	●	●	○	●
	SET A5 (1/14)	●	○	○	○	●	●	●
	SET A6 (3/14)	●	○	○	○	●	○	●
	SET A7 (2/14)	○	○	○	●	●	○	○
Opera	SET A8 (2/9)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A9 (1/9)	●	○	◐	●	●	●	●
	SET A10 (2/9)	●	○	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A11 (1/9)	●	○	○	●	●	○	●
	SET A12 (1/9)	●	○	○	○	●	●	●
	SET A13 (1/9)	●	○	○	○	●	○	●
	SET A14 (1/9)	○	○	○	●	●	○	○
Firefox	SET A15 (2/5)	●	●	◐	●	○	●	○
	SET A16 (1/5)	●	●	○	●	○	○	○
	SET A17 (1/5)	●	●	○	○	○	○	○
	SET A18 (1/5)	○	●	○	●	○	○	○
Edge	SET A19 (1/4)	●	●	◐	●	○	●	N/A
	SET A20 (1/4)	●	○	○	●	○	●	N/A
	SET A21 (1/4)	○	●	○	●	○	●	N/A
	SET A22 (1/4)	○	○	○	●	○	●	N/A

●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirect	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW		
Chrome	SET A1 (3/14)	●	<pre><html manifest='/manifest.appcache'></pre> <pre>CACHE MANIFEST</pre> <pre># ...</pre> <pre>CACHE:</pre> <pre>https://tracker.com/report/?leak=appcache-cache</pre>						
	SET A2 (3/14)	●							
	SET A3 (1/14)	●							
	SET A4 (1/14)	●							
	SET A5 (1/14)	●							
	SET A6 (3/14)	●							
	SET A7 (2/14)	○							
Opera	SET A8 (2/9)	●	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>-1</td> <td>chrome.tabs.TAB_ID_NONE</td> <td>Since Chrome 46. An ID that represents the absence of a browser tab.</td> </tr> </table>	-1	chrome.tabs.TAB_ID_NONE	Since Chrome 46. An ID that represents the absence of a browser tab.			
	-1	chrome.tabs.TAB_ID_NONE		Since Chrome 46. An ID that represents the absence of a browser tab.					
	SET A9 (1/9)	●							
	SET A10 (2/9)	●							
	SET A11 (1/9)	●							
	SET A12 (1/9)	●							
SET A13 (1/9)	●								
SET A14 (1/9)	○		<pre>tabs.TAB_ID_NONE</pre> <p>A special ID value given to tabs that are not browser tabs (for example, tabs in devtools windows).</p>						
Firefox	SET A15 (2/5)	●							
	SET A16 (1/5)	●							
	SET A17 (1/5)	●							
	SET A18 (1/5)	○							
Edge	SET A19 (1/4)	●							
	SET A20 (1/4)	●							
	SET A21 (1/4)	○							
	SET A22 (1/4)	○							

●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

		AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirect	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW	
Chrome	SET A1 (3/14)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
	SET A2 (3/14)	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	
	SET A3 (1/14)	●	○	●	●	●	●	●	
	SET A4 (1/14)	Local Service Worker						→	●
	SET A5 (1/14)	- Fetch				tabId == -1		→	●
	SET A6 (3/14)	- XHR						→	●
	SET A7 (2/14)	- SendBeacon						→	●
Opera	SET A8 (2/9)	- EventSource						→	●
	SET A9 (1/9)	- ...						→	○
	SET A10 (2/9)							→	○
	SET A11 (1/9)							→	○
	SET A12 (1/9)							→	○
	SET A13 (1/9)							→	○
Firefox	SET A14 (1/9)							→	○
	SET A15 (2/5)							→	○
	SET A16 (1/5)							→	○
	SET A17 (1/5)							→	○
Edge	SET A18 (1/5)							→	○
	SET A19 (1/4)	●	●	●	●	○	●	N/A	
	SET A20 (1/4)	●	○	●	●	○	●	N/A	
	SET A21 (1/4)	○	●	○	●	○	●	N/A	
	SET A22 (1/4)	○	○	●	●	○	●	N/A	

●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

	AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirect	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome	SET A1 (3/14)	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A2 (3/14)	●	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A3 (1/14)	●	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A4 (1/14)	●	○	●	●	○	●
	SET A5 (1/14)	●	○	○	●	●	●
	SET A6 (3/14)	●	○	○	○	●	●
	SET A7 (2/14)	○	○	○	○	○	○
Opera	SET A8 (2/9)	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A9 (1/9)	●	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A10 (2/9)	●	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A11 (1/9)	●	○	●	●	○	●
	SET A12 (1/9)	●	○	○	●	●	●
	SET A13 (1/9)	●	○	○	○	○	○
	SET A14 (1/9)	○	○	○	○	○	○
Firefox	SET A15 (2/5)	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A16 (1/5)	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A17 (1/5)	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A18 (1/5)	○	●	○	○	○	○
Edge	SET A19 (1/4)	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A20 (1/4)	●	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A21 (1/4)	○	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A22 (1/4)	○	○	○	○	○	○

`<link rel="shortcut icon" href="https://tracker.com/?url=example.com" />`

Fetching of favicon
- was already reported
- now FIXED



●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request

		AppCache	HTML	Headers	Redirect	PDF JS	JavaScript	SW
Chrome	SET A1 (3/14)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A2 (3/14)	●	○	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A3 (1/14)	●	○	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A4 (1/14)	●	○	○	●	●	○	●
	SET A5 (1/14)	●	○	○	○	●	●	●
	SET A6 (3/14)	●	○	○	○	●	●	●
	SET A7 (2/14)	○	○	○	●	●	○	○
Opera	SET A8 (2/9)	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A9 (1/9)	●	○	●	●	●	●	●
	SET A10 (2/9)	●	○	○	●	●	●	●
	SET A11 (1/9)	●	○	○	●	●	○	●
	SET A12 (1/9)	●	○	○	○	●	●	●
	SET A13 (1/9)	●	○	○	○	●	○	●
	SET A14 (1/9)	○	○	○	●	●	○	○
Firefox	SET A15 (2/5)	●	●	●	●	○	●	○
	SET A16 (1/5)	●	●	○	●	○	○	○
	SET A17 (1/5)	●	●	○	○	○	○	○
	SET A18 (1/5)	○	●	○	●	○	○	○
Edge	SET A19 (1/4)	●	●	●	●	○	●	○
	SET A20 (1/4)	●	○	○	●	○	●	○
	SET A21 (1/4)	○	●	○	●	○	●	○
	SET A22 (1/4)	○	○	○	●	○	●	○


●: request with cookies

◐: request without cookies

○: no request


PDFium design flaw

Chrome and Opera




PDFium design flaw

Chrome and Opera



PDFium design flaw

Chrome and Opera




PDFium design flaw

Chrome and Opera




Plugin / Extension



DomainB

PDFium design flaw

Chrome and Opera



Extensions

- › No extension managed to block all third-party cookies to blacklisted domains
- › Insufficient API
 - ›› PDF JS for Chromium, but also Firefox favicon (HTML tags)
- › Unclear API
 - ›› No clear distinction for browser background requests
- › Common mistakes
 - ›› Insufficient permissions to intercept certain requests

Same-site cookie policy

- › Chrome and Opera: prerender functionality
 - ›› Both lax and strict included in cross-site request
- › Edge
 - ›› Lax bypasses: WebSocket API, <embed>, <object>
 - ›› Strict bypasses: WebSocket API, redirects
- › Firefox and Safari: no bugs detected

Exploitation of a bypass

Same-site cookies




bank.com

victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



Exploitation of a bypass

Same-site cookies




bank.com

victim

cute-kittens.com

doggo-bank.com



```
<link rel="prerender" href="https://bank.com/transfer.php  
?amount=999999&recipient=attacker" />
```

Evaluation of the framework

Completeness and novelty

- › Distributed crawler setup
 - ›› Interception of headless Chrome network traffic (using linux network namespaces)
 - ›› Analysis of intercepted HTTP requests
- › Alexa Top 10,000 websites
 - ›› Up to 20 pages on each website
 - ›› 160,059 pages visited

Reevaluation: significant bugfixes?

- › Chrome 71: fixed third-party cookie block bypass by PDF
- › Opera 57
 - ›› FIXED: prerender bypass for same-site cookies
 - ›› PARTIALLY FIXED: built-in adblocker blocks HTML mechanisms
- › Bug fixing is rather slow



Conclusion

Conclusion

Initial findings

- › Built-in browser policies can be bypassed
 - ›› Same-site cookie, third-party cookie policies
 - ›› Advanced options (e.g. Opera AdBlocker, Firefox Tracking Protection)
- › All adblocking and privacy extensions can be bypassed
 - ›› Due to extension API provided by browsers
 - ›› Due to common mistakes by extension developers

Future work

What about other policies?

- › Expansion of framework

- ›› Policy-wise → private browsing mode, security (e.g. CSP)
- ›› Platform-wise → mobile browsers

- › Goal: tool for comprehensive, automated analysis of security and privacy policy implementations

Illustration of importance

The prerender bug (same-site cookie policy bypass)

- › Originally reported for Chrome 57
- › Present in: 58 59 60 61
- › Fixed in: 62 63 64 65
- › Reintroduced in: 66 67 68 69 70 71

- › Shows importance of a comprehensive evaluation of implemented policies

The logo for DistriNet features the word "DistriNet" in a white, sans-serif font. The letter "i" has a blue arrow pointing downwards from its dot. The letter "N" is white, and the letter "e" is composed of three horizontal blue bars. The "t" is white.

Thank you!

<https://WhoLeftOpenTheCookieJar.com>

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